P-Prompt: Intimacy vs Property: Difference between revisions

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This prompt has been contributed by '''[[Biographies#Andrea Francke|Andrea Francke]]''' who proposes to revisit the “infectious concept” of property and sovereignty. She writes, “I’m annoyed by radical structures that reify the idea of property as THE way to think about our relations to each other and the world.” Rather, she calls for the courage to pay attention to the actual ways we exist with each other, what she calls “the intimacy of interdependency”.
This prompt has been contributed by '''[[Biographies#Andrea Francke|Andrea Francke]]''' who proposes to revisit the “infectious concept” of property and sovereignty. She writes, “I’m annoyed by radical structures that reify the idea of property as THE way to think about our relations to each other and the world.” Rather, she calls for the courage to pay attention to the actual ways we exist with each other, what she calls “the intimacy of interdependency”.


With the help of a selection of texts, from Thi C. Nguyen<ref name="Thi2"/> and Matthew Strohl to Lauren Berlant and Mia Mingus, Andrea provides different entry points to thinking about the shift from property to intimacy. For the ones who have difficulties to engage with long texts, Andrea sent short introductions summarizing the texts main ideas as well as Andrea's rationale of selecting them. She also sent audio recordings of her prompt with spoken word for ease of access.  
With the help of a selection of texts, from Thi C. Nguyen and Matthew Strohl to Lauren Berlant and Mia Mingus, Andrea provides different entry points to thinking about the shift from property to intimacy. For the ones who have difficulties to engage with long texts, she prepared short introductions summarizing the texts main ideas, as well as her rationale for selecting them. She also sent audio recordings of her prompt with spoken word for ease of access.
Here comes her prompt:
 
&rarr; See [[P-Prompt: Real life examples|Prompt: Real life examples]]


<div class="prompt">
<div class="prompt">
[[File:AF 1Prompt.jpg |thumb|left]] '''Intimacy vs. Property'''<ref name="Lamis"/> <br/> I’m annoyed by radical structures that reify the idea of '''property''' as THE way to think about our relations to each other and the world.  
== Intimacy vs. Property<ref>Special thanks to Lamis Bayar who always edits my texts in what feels like continuous conversation.</ref> ==
Property is such an infectious concept. In my practice, from looking at motherhood to book piracy to how we evaluate social art practice, it seems that the first thing I encounter is always a taken-for-granted, a postulate: that the path to change and thence liberation is just a matter of redistributing '''property''' rights to the RIGHT people and the enabling of “our" '''sovereignty'''.  
 
[https://reuse.constantvzw.org/index.php?title=Prompt_06:_Intimacy_vs_Property '''&rarr; Listen to Andrea''']
 
[[File:AF 1Prompt.jpg|150px|right]]
 
I’m annoyed by radical structures that reify the idea of '''property''' as THE way to think about our relations to each other and the world.  
Property is such an infectious concept. In my practice, from looking at motherhood to book piracy to how we evaluate social art practice, it seems that the first thing I encounter is always a taken-for-granted, a postulate: that the path to change and thence liberation is just a matter of redistributing '''property''' rights to the RIGHT people and the enabling of “our" '''sovereignty'''.<br>
I see this as a trap. One that makes it almost impossible to imagine a different way to think about ourselves and the world. We are terrified of what would happen if we didn’t own the things we '''care''' for.  
I see this as a trap. One that makes it almost impossible to imagine a different way to think about ourselves and the world. We are terrified of what would happen if we didn’t own the things we '''care''' for.  


But I think that it is the ‘we '''care''' for’ that matters. That there is a different form of '''relationality''' that can only exist once we '''refuse''' to play the property and '''sovereignty game''' and pay attention to the actual ways in which we exist with each other. '''I call this the intimacy of interdependency.'''
But I think that it is the ‘we '''care''' for’ that matters. That there is a different form of '''relationality''' that can only exist once we '''refuse''' to play the property and '''sovereignty game''' and pay attention to the actual ways in which we exist with each other. '''I call this the intimacy of interdependency.'''


In this prompt, I propose that the Collective Conditions for Re-Use falls into the same trap. That in its attempts to solve the ‘problem’ of intersectionality and power imbalances in systems like copy-left or creative commons, it reifies the all too well established (mis)conception that '''property''' is the only way in which we can think ourselves and the world, expanding the market into every sphere of our lives — particularly those spheres which specifically sought to separate themselves of the market. That it attempts to improve what needs to be dismantled.<ref name="Daniel"/>  
In this prompt, I propose that the Collective Conditions for Re-Use falls into the same trap. That in its attempts to solve the ‘problem’ of intersectionality and power imbalances in systems like copy-left or creative commons, it reifies the all too well established (mis)conception that '''property''' is the only way in which we can think ourselves and the world, expanding the market into every sphere of our lives — particularly those spheres which specifically sought to separate themselves of the market. That it attempts to improve what needs to be dismantled.<ref>
Thank you to Daniel Rourke for introducing me to this quote from Boris Groys: “I hope that the political function of these two divergent and even contradictory notions of aestheticization—artistic aestheticization and design aestheticization—has now became more clear. Design wants to change reality, the status quo—it wants to improve reality, to make it more attractive, better to use. Art seems to accept reality as it is, to accept the status quo. But art accepts the status quo as dysfunctional, as already failed—that is, from the revolutionary, or even postrevolutionary, perspective. Contemporary art puts our contemporaneity into art museums because it does not believe in the stability of the present conditions of our existence—to such a degree that contemporary art does not even try to improve these conditions. By defunctionalizing the status quo, art prefigures its coming revolutionary overturn.“ (Groys, 2014)</ref><br>
This is a prompt to imagine that we already have a much more sophisticated and interesting way to relate to what we all bring into being in the world. We do. '''We just need to stop making frameworks''' that try to make it legible and accessible to systems of power.
This is a prompt to imagine that we already have a much more sophisticated and interesting way to relate to what we all bring into being in the world. We do. '''We just need to stop making frameworks''' that try to make it legible and accessible to systems of power.


This prompt gestures towards a series of texts and notes that offer different definitions, doubts/limitations, and ways to use '''intimacy''' to think together about what could exist in place of the idea of '''intellectual property'''. I’m fully aware that these ways require profound changes in how we organise the world. I don’t have a solution. I just want us to imagine better.
This prompt gestures towards a series of texts and notes that offer different definitions, doubts/limitations, and ways to use '''intimacy''' to think together about what could exist in place of the idea of '''intellectual property'''. I’m fully aware that these ways require profound changes in how we organise the world. I don’t have a solution. I just want us to imagine better.
Andrea Francke<br/>
Andrea Francke<br/>
London, 4th of April 2024
London, 4th of April 2024
<references>
<ref name="Lamis">Special thanks to Lamis Bayar who always edits my texts in what feels like continuous conversation.</ref>
<ref name="Thi2">See also Thi C. Nguyen's prompt [https://reuse.constantvzw.org/index.php?title=Prompt_07:_CC4r_case_studies''#7, Case Studies'']</ref>
<ref name="Daniel">Thank you to Daniel Rourke for introducing me to this quote from Boris Groys:
“I hope that the political function of these two divergent and even contradictory notions of aestheticization—artistic aestheticization and design aestheticization—has now became more clear. Design wants to change reality, the status quo—it wants to improve reality, to make it more attractive, better to use. Art seems to accept reality as it is, to accept the status quo. But art accepts the status quo as dysfunctional, as already failed—that is, from the revolutionary, or even postrevolutionary, perspective. Contemporary art puts our contemporaneity into art museums because it does not believe in the stability of the present conditions of our existence—to such a degree that contemporary art does not even try to improve these conditions. By defunctionalizing the status quo, art prefigures its coming revolutionary overturn. “
Groys, B. (2014) ‘On Art Activism - Journal #56’, e-flux Journal [Preprint], (56). Available at: https://www.e-flux.com/journal/56/60343/on-art-activism/ (Accessed: 19 February 2024).
(2014)
</ref>
</references>
[https://reuse.constantvzw.org/index.php?title=Prompt_06:_Intimacy_vs_Property '''&rarr; Listen to Andrea''']
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</div>


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<div class="material">
=== Group Intimacy ===


<div class="material">
[https://reuse.constantvzw.org/images/3/3c/2_AF_Intimacy_vs_Property_Group_Intimacy.mp3 '''&rarr; Listen to Andrea''']


[[File:AF 2Ngyuen and Strohl.jpg |thumb|left]]
[[File:AF 2Ngyuen and Strohl.jpg|150px|right]]
'''Text #1 Group Intimacy'''


Nguyen and Strohl’s text is in itself a prompt. It proposes a framework of '''group intimacy''' as one way to dismantle the concept of cultural appropriation, intimacy re-placing the centrality of '''property''' in that debate.
Nguyen and Strohl’s text is in itself a prompt. It proposes a framework of '''group intimacy''' as one way to dismantle the concept of cultural appropriation, intimacy re-placing the centrality of '''property''' in that debate.<br>
Many accounts of intimacy in academia are constructed around privacy and publicness, but Nguyen and Strohl foreground those aspects of intimacy that are most interesting to me, the relational aspects.  
Many accounts of intimacy in academia are constructed around privacy and publicness, but Nguyen and Strohl foreground those aspects of intimacy that are most interesting to me, the relational aspects.  


<blockquote>“Her [Inness’] account is intended to explain interpersonal intimacy, but we suggest that it points to a promising way of understanding '''group intimacy'''<ref name="Thi"/>. For Inness, what makes an act intimate is that it expresses an agent’s loving, liking or '''caring''' for another person and thereby has special meaning and value for the agent. We propose that, in the case of larger groups, what makes a practice intimate is that it functions to embody or promote a sense of common identity and group connection among participants in the practice, and thereby renders it meaningful and valuable to these participants.” (Thi Nguyen and Strohl, 2019, p. 12)</blockquote>
<blockquote>“Her [Inness’] account is intended to explain interpersonal intimacy, but we suggest that it points to a promising way of understanding '''group intimacy'''.<ref>As referred to by Nguyen and Strohl: Inness, J.C. (1996) Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.</ref>  For Inness, what makes an act intimate is that it expresses an agent’s loving, liking or '''caring''' for another person and thereby has special meaning and value for the agent. We propose that, in the case of larger groups, what makes a practice intimate is that it functions to embody or promote a sense of common identity and group connection among participants in the practice, and thereby renders it meaningful and valuable to these participants.” (Thi Nguyen and Strohl, 2019, p. 12)</blockquote>


Once we move away from property and into relationality, ideas of care, affection and maintenance gain in importance. If the process of how we use stuff, including ideas and the expression of those ideas by others, is concerned with if and how we are extracting or contributing — who are we '''inconveniencing'''? how are we contributing to our communities or despoiling them? how are we '''inconvenienced'''? — and if those effects are constantly negotiated and re-considered, then how does a license facilitate or obscure our relation to those '''inconveniences''' and to others?   
Once we move away from property and into relationality, ideas of care, affection and maintenance gain in importance. If the process of how we use stuff, including ideas and the expression of those ideas by others, is concerned with if and how we are extracting or contributing — who are we '''inconveniencing'''? how are we contributing to our communities or despoiling them? how are we '''inconvenienced'''? — and if those effects are constantly negotiated and re-considered, then how does a license facilitate or obscure our relation to those '''inconveniences''' and to others?   
    
    
<blockquote>“But, crucially, the '''intimacy''' account does not yield objective determinations about who can participate in an intimate practice. '''Intimacy''' is flexible — relations of '''intimacy''' can be extended, outsiders can be granted temporary or long-term insider status, insiders can be exiled, and boundaries can be re-drawn. Furthermore, notice the order of operations with intimacy. It is not the case that a relationship is first established as intimate, and only then can the participants in the relationship engage in intimate acts. Engaging in intimate acts is what constitutes an intimate relationship. […] Intimate groups can sometimes self-constitute through intimate practices – they can come into existence as a result of self-identification, valuation, and mutual engagement through intimate practices.” (Thi Nguyen and Strohl, 2019, p. 16)
<blockquote>“But, crucially, the '''intimacy''' account does not yield objective determinations about who can participate in an intimate practice. '''Intimacy''' is flexible — relations of '''intimacy''' can be extended, outsiders can be granted temporary or long-term insider status, insiders can be exiled, and boundaries can be re-drawn. Furthermore, notice the order of operations with intimacy. It is not the case that a relationship is first established as intimate, and only then can the participants in the relationship engage in intimate acts. Engaging in intimate acts is what constitutes an intimate relationship. […] Intimate groups can sometimes self-constitute through intimate practices – they can come into existence as a result of self-identification, valuation, and mutual engagement through intimate practices.” (Thi Nguyen and Strohl, 2019, p. 16)</blockquote>
(Thi Nguyen and Strohl, 2019, p. 16)</blockquote>


<references>
=== On Intimacy and On the Inconvenience of Other People ===
<ref name="Thi">As referred to by Nguyen and Strohl: Inness, J.C. (1996) Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
</ref>
</references>
 
 
Thi Nguyen, C., and Matthew Strohl. ‘Cultural Appropriation and the Intimacy of Groups’. Philosophical Studies 176, no. 4 (1 April 2019): 981–1002, [https://reuse.constantvzw.org/images/6/6c/Nguyen%2C_Strohl_%282019%29_Cultural_Appropriation_and_the_Intimacy.pdf PDF]


[https://reuse.constantvzw.org/images/3/3c/2_AF_Intimacy_vs_Property_Group_Intimacy.mp3 '''&rarr; Listen to Andrea''']
[https://reuse.constantvzw.org/images/3/3c/2_AF_Intimacy_vs_Property_Group_Intimacy.mp3 '''&rarr; Listen to Andrea''']
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<div class="material">


[[File:AF 3Lautent Berlant.jpg|thumb|left]]
[[File:AF 3Lautent Berlant.jpg|150px|right]]
'''Text #2 On Intimacy and On the Inconvenience of Other People'''


A contract holds the potential for '''clarity''' (Nguyen, 2021), for stability, for a resolution. What is so seductive about '''sovereignty'''<ref name="Berlant1"/> and '''property''' is the illusion that you have a firm ground to stand on.
A contract holds the potential for '''clarity''' (Nguyen, 2021), for stability, for a resolution. What is so seductive about '''sovereignty'''<ref>“As I argue in the introduction, my view is that sovereignty is at root a defense against occupation or dispossession, which is why it’s become central to antagonisms about jurisdiction, and not anything like a natural right or natural state. “(Berlant, 2022, p. 80)</ref> and '''property''' is the illusion that you have a firm ground to stand on.<br>
Intimacy refuses the stability of '''clarity''' because '''relationality''' (that is '''interdependence''') is almost never stable. '''Intimacy''' is always already negotiated between subjects, at a bodily scale. The way you related to someone’s work yesterday might no longer be quite right today, and vice-versa. When you realise someone is using your work in a way that you don’t agree with, or in a way that erases you, or when you realise you’ve used someone’s work in a way that has harmed them or annoyed them, you feel it '''in your body'''. That’s what I want to hold onto. To refuse the creation of a ‘neutral’ admin infrastructure that takes the awkwardness <ref name="Berlant2"/>out.
Intimacy refuses the stability of '''clarity''' because '''relationality''' (that is '''interdependence''') is almost never stable. '''Intimacy''' is always already negotiated between subjects, at a bodily scale. The way you related to someone’s work yesterday might no longer be quite right today, and vice-versa. When you realise someone is using your work in a way that you don’t agree with, or in a way that erases you, or when you realise you’ve used someone’s work in a way that has harmed them or annoyed them, you feel it '''in your body'''. That’s what I want to hold onto. To refuse the creation of a ‘neutral’ admin infrastructure that takes the awkwardness<ref>For an expanded definition of awkwardness, listen to: Francke, A. and de Kersaint Giraudeau, M. (2016) Bad Vibes Club at CCA - The Rise of the Awkward Turtle. Available at: https://soundcloud.com/ccaderrylondonderry/bad-vibes-club-at-cca-the-rise-of-the-awkward-turtle (Accessed: 8 April 2024).</ref> out.


<blockquote>“I didn't think it would turn out this way” is the secret epitaph of intimacy. To intimate is to communicate with the sparest of signs and gestures, and at its root intimacy has the quality of eloquence and brevity. But intimacy also involves an aspiration for a narrative about something shared, a story about both oneself and others that will turn out in a particular way.” (Berlant, 1998, p. 282)</blockquote>
<blockquote>“I didn't think it would turn out this way” is the secret epitaph of intimacy. To intimate is to communicate with the sparest of signs and gestures, and at its root intimacy has the quality of eloquence and brevity. But intimacy also involves an aspiration for a narrative about something shared, a story about both oneself and others that will turn out in a particular way.” (Berlant, 1998, p. 282)</blockquote>


My favourite part of Berlant’s text is the acknowledgement of how terrifying intimacy can be, how much can and will go wrong, how much needs to be constantly renegotiated. <ref name="Berlant3"/>
My favourite part of Berlant’s text is the acknowledgement of how terrifying intimacy can be, how much can and will go wrong, how much needs to be constantly renegotiated.<ref>“It shows how some thinkers use the commons concept to move away from good-life fantasies that equate frictionlessness with justice and satisfaction with the absence of frustration.“ (Berlant, 2022, p. 81)</ref>
<blockquote>“There, and here, the commons concept serves as a preserve for an optimistic attachment to recaptioning the potential for collective '''nonsovereignty''' and as a register for the gatekeeping and surveillance that organises still so many collective pleasures.  
<blockquote>“There, and here, the commons concept serves as a preserve for an optimistic attachment to recaptioning the potential for collective '''nonsovereignty''' and as a register for the gatekeeping and surveillance that organises still so many collective pleasures.  
So, if the commons claim sounds like an incontestably positive aim, I think of it more as a tool, and often a weapon, for unlearning the world, which is key to not reproducing it.“(Berlant, 2022, p. 80)</blockquote>
So, if the commons claim sounds like an incontestably positive aim, I think of it more as a tool, and often a weapon, for unlearning the world, which is key to not reproducing it.“ (Berlant, 2022, p. 80)</blockquote>


=== Access Intimacy and Liberatory Access ===


<references>
[https://reuse.constantvzw.org/images/f/f3/4_AF_Access_Intimacy.mp3 '''&rarr; Listen to Andrea''']
<ref name="Berlant1">“As I argue in the introduction, my view is that sovereignty is at root a defense against occupation or dispossession, which is why it’s become central to antagonisms about jurisdiction, and not anything like a natural right or natural state. “(Berlant, 2022, p. 80)</ref>
<ref name="Berlant2">For an expanded definition of awkwardness, listen to: Francke, A. and de Kersaint Giraudeau, M. (2016) Bad Vibes Club at CCA - The Rise of the Awkward Turtle. Available at: https://soundcloud.com/ccaderrylondonderry/bad-vibes-club-at-cca-the-rise-of-the-awkward-turtle (Accessed: 8 April 2024).</ref>
<ref name="Berlant3">  “It shows how some thinkers use the commons concept to move away from good-life fantasies that equate frictionlessness with justice and satisfaction with the absence of frustration.“ (Berlant, 2022, p. 81)</ref>
</references>
 
 
 
Berlant, Lauren. ‘Intimacy: A Special Issue’. Critical
Inquiry 24, no. 2 (1998): 281–88. [https://reuse.constantvzw.org/images/c/ce/3_Berlant_-_1998_-_Intimacy_A_Special_Issue.pdf PDF]
 
Berlant, L.G. (2022) On the inconvenience of other people. Durham: Duke University Press (Writing
matters!). [https://reuse.constantvzw.org/images/5/5c/3_On_the_Inconvenience_of_Other_People_-_Lauren_Berlant.pdf PDF]
 
 
[https://reuse.constantvzw.org/images/3/3c/2_AF_Intimacy_vs_Property_Group_Intimacy.mp3 '''&rarr; Listen to Andrea''']
 
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[[File:AF 4Mia Mingus.jpg|150px|right]]


<div class="material">
Mingus’ access '''intimacy'''<ref>“And I want to be clear, I didn’t invent access intimacy, I simply gave a name to something that was happening in my life and I hope it’s useful to others. Just because you name something doesn’t mean you invented it.”(Mingus, 2017)</ref> is about the closeness that happens when someone has an immediate (or intuitive) understanding of your access needs, when certain conditions are met in a moment of relationality that means you can be vulnerable, '''cared for''', and '''caring for''' someone else, sometimes without previously having known each other. (Mingus, 2011)
[[File:AF 4Mia Mingus.jpg |thumb|left]]
'''Text #3 Access Intimacy and Liberatory Access'''
 
Mingus’ access '''intimacy''' <ref name="Mingus1"/> is about the closeness that happens when someone has an immediate (or intuitive) understanding of your access needs, when certain conditions are met in a moment of relationality that means you can be vulnerable, '''cared for''', and '''caring for''' someone else, sometimes without previously having known each other. (Mingus, 2011)
Mingus uses access intimacy '''to imagine a different way''' in which abled and disabled people '''can imagine a different future''', one that cannot be brought into being by policy, bureaucracy or design. It’s a call for a political re-organisation of the world around interdependence and away from ideas of '''sovereignty'''.
Mingus uses access intimacy '''to imagine a different way''' in which abled and disabled people '''can imagine a different future''', one that cannot be brought into being by policy, bureaucracy or design. It’s a call for a political re-organisation of the world around interdependence and away from ideas of '''sovereignty'''.


Line 115: Line 73:
'''Liberatory access''' calls upon us to create different values for accessibility than we have historically had. It demands that the responsibility for access shifts '''from being an individual responsibility to a collective responsibility'''. That access shifts from being silencing to freeing; from being isolating to connecting; from hidden and invisible to visible; from burdensome to valuable; from a resentful obligation to an opportunity; from shameful to powerful; from ridged to creative. It’s the “good” kind of access, the moments when we are pleasantly surprised and feel seen. It is a way of doing access that transforms both our “today” and our “tomorrow.” In this way, liberatory access both resists against the world we don’t want and actively builds the world we do want.”(Mingus, 2017)</blockquote>
'''Liberatory access''' calls upon us to create different values for accessibility than we have historically had. It demands that the responsibility for access shifts '''from being an individual responsibility to a collective responsibility'''. That access shifts from being silencing to freeing; from being isolating to connecting; from hidden and invisible to visible; from burdensome to valuable; from a resentful obligation to an opportunity; from shameful to powerful; from ridged to creative. It’s the “good” kind of access, the moments when we are pleasantly surprised and feel seen. It is a way of doing access that transforms both our “today” and our “tomorrow.” In this way, liberatory access both resists against the world we don’t want and actively builds the world we do want.”(Mingus, 2017)</blockquote>


I propose we think about '''intimacy''' in an abolitionist way. I know that we live in a world that is mediated by laws, contracts and infrastructures built upon and which consolidate the idea of '''property''' (and rentiers). But I propose that we should imagine and practice a different way of being that is invested in relations over '''property'''.  
I propose we think about '''intimacy''' in an abolitionist way. I know that we live in a world that is mediated by laws, contracts and infrastructures built upon and which consolidate the idea of '''property''' (and rentiers). But I propose that we should imagine and practice a different way of being that is invested in relations over '''property'''.<br>
We are too solely invested in the idea that the way to solve issues of labour and distribution, and even equality, is to multiply access to property rights.  
We are too solely invested in the idea that the way to solve issues of labour and distribution, and even equality, is to multiply access to property rights.  


=== Other possible references to think intimacy vs. property with ===


<references>
[https://reuse.constantvzw.org/images/5/50/5_AF_Intimacy_vs_Property_Other.mp3'''&rarr; Listen to Andrea''']
<ref name="Mingus1">  “And I want to be clear, I didn’t invent access intimacy, I simply gave a name to something that was happening in my life and I hope it’s useful to others. Just because you name something doesn’t mean you invented it.”(Mingus, 2017)</ref>
</references>


[[File:AF 5Other references.jpg|150px|right]]


A few years ago, I started a basic Quechua course.<ref>Curso introductorio de Quechua Chanka | sesión 4: presentarse y pedir información (2020). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLe4DNTZx3LngmX5xSJUuowp5jLL_ZZOui (Accessed: 2 April 2024).</ref> Quechua is one of the indigenous languages spoken in Peru, where I’m from. Although I’ve never learnt it as a child, I’ve realised as I’ve grown older how much of the Quechua language and culture — sometimes called Andean Philosophy — has influenced the way I think and live the world. In one of the sessions, the teacher talked about how there are no native Quechua words for ‘please’ and ‘thank you’, only neologisms needed to adapt the language to a European framework. She explained how you don’t need the words for ‘please’ and ‘thank you’ because those are just words that allowed Europeans not to act.<br>
On the other hand, she explained, if you are part of a Quechua community, you will keep an eye on what is needed, and then just do it.<ref>This form of attention and responsiveness sounds very similar to Mia Mingus’s Access Intimacy.</ref> You won’t need a ‘please’, and you won’t expect a ‘thank you’. At some point, if you need help, there will be other people around you paying attention and help will happen.<br>
That relation between attention, '''care''', and being part of a (or many) community(ies) made so much sense to me. This is also part of an understanding of the world in which the non-human is very present. This relation of '''intimacy''' that allows one to perceive when one is needed and act, exists also in relation to mountains, animals, places, etc. It made me think about my relation to other people’s work, how I share things – including things that aren’t mine, to how I put things in the world and how accessible I construct them so people can take them apart and use them.<br>
There is another approach that I wanted to include, but I just didn’t have the time. In ''The Logic of Care'', Annemarie Mol looks at the relationships between the ill and their carers. Mol proposes that those relations follow a different logic that refuses the logic of choice (which either follows consumer or citizenship logics) but instead is constructed collaboratively through continued '''attunement'''.


Mingus, M. (2011) ‘Access Intimacy: The Missing Link’,
== Footnotes ==
Leaving Evidence, 5 May. Available at:
https://leavingevidence.wordpress.com/2011/05/05/acces
s-intimacy-the-missing-link/ (Accessed: 19 February
2024).


Mingus, M. (2017) ‘Access Intimacy, Interdependence
<references />
and Disability Justice’, Leaving Evidence, 12 April.
Available at: https://leavingevidence.wordpress.com/2017/04/12/acces
s-intimacy-interdependence-and-disability-justice/
(Accessed: 19 February 2024).


[https://reuse.constantvzw.org/images/f/f3/4_AF_Access_Intimacy.mp3 '''&rarr; Listen to Andrea''']
== Bibliography ==


</div>
Berlant, Lauren. ‘Intimacy: A Special Issue’. Critical
Inquiry 24, no. 2 (1998): 281–88. [https://reuse.constantvzw.org/images/c/ce/3_Berlant_-_1998_-_Intimacy_A_Special_Issue.pdf PDF]


<br clear=all>
Berlant, L.G. (2022) On the inconvenience of other people. Durham: Duke University Press (Writing
matters!). [https://reuse.constantvzw.org/images/5/5c/3_On_the_Inconvenience_of_Other_People_-_Lauren_Berlant.pdf PDF]


<div class="material">
Groys, B. (2014) ‘On Art Activism - Journal #56’, e-flux Journal [Preprint], (56). Available at: https://www.e-flux.com/journal/56/60343/on-art-activism/ (Accessed: 19 February 2024).


[[File:AF 5Other references.jpg|thumb|left]]
Thi Nguyen, C., and Matthew Strohl. ‘Cultural Appropriation and the Intimacy of Groups’. Philosophical Studies 176, no. 4 (1 April 2019): 981–1002, [https://reuse.constantvzw.org/images/6/6c/Nguyen%2C_Strohl_%282019%29_Cultural_Appropriation_and_the_Intimacy.pdf PDF]
<b>Text #4 Other possible references to think intimacy vs. property with</b><br/>


A few years ago, I started a basic Quechua course.<ref name="course"/> Quechua is one of the indigenous languages spoken in Peru, where I’m from. Although I’ve never learnt it as a child, I’ve realised as I’ve grown older how much of the Quechua language and culture — sometimes called Andean Philosophy — has influenced the way I think and live the world. In one of the sessions, the teacher talked about how there are no native Quechua words for ‘please’ and ‘thank you’, only neologisms needed to adapt the language to a European framework. She explained how you don’t need the words for ‘please’ and ‘thank you’ because those are just words that allowed Europeans not to act.
Mingus, M. (2011) ‘Access Intimacy: The Missing Link’, Leaving Evidence, 5 May. Available at: https://leavingevidence.wordpress.com/2011/05/05/access-intimacy-the-missing-link/ (Accessed: 19 February 2024).
On the other hand, she explained, if you are part of a Quechua community, you will keep an eye on what is needed, and then just do it.<ref name="attention"/> You won’t need a ‘please’, and you won’t expect a ‘thank you’. At some point, if you need help, there will be other people around you paying attention and help will happen.
That relation between attention, '''care''', and being part of a (or many) community(ies) made so much sense to me. This is also part of an understanding of the world in which the non-human is very present. This relation of '''intimacy''' that allows one to perceive when one is needed and act, exists also in relation to mountains, animals, places, etc. It made me think about my relation to other people’s work, how I share things – including things that aren’t mine, to how I put things in the world and how accessible I construct them so people can take them apart and use them.
There is another approach that I wanted to include, but I just didn’t have the time. In ''The Logic of Care'', Annemarie Mol looks at the relationships between the ill and their carers. Mol proposes that those relations follow a different logic that refuses the logic of choice (which either follows consumer or citizenship logics) but instead is constructed collaboratively through continued '''attunement'''.  


Mingus, M. (2017) ‘Access Intimacy, Interdependence and Disability Justice’, Leaving Evidence, 12 April. Available at: https://leavingevidence.wordpress.com/2017/04/12/access-intimacy-interdependence-and-disability-justice/ (Accessed: 19 February 2024).


<references>
Mol, A. (2008) The logic of care: health and the problem of patient choice.
<ref name="course"> Curso introductorio de Quechua Chanka | sesión 4: presentarse y pedir información (2020). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLe4DNTZx3LngmX5xSJUuowp5jLL_ZZOui (Accessed: 2 April 2024).</ref>


<ref name="attention">This form of attention and responsiveness sounds very similar to Mia Mingus’s Access Intimacy.</ref>
</references>
Mol, A. (2008) The logic of care: health and the problem
of patient choice.
[https://reuse.constantvzw.org/images/5/50/5_AF_Intimacy_vs_Property_Other.mp3'''&rarr; Listen to Andrea''']
</div>
</div>

Revision as of 09:47, 25 July 2024

This prompt has been contributed by Andrea Francke who proposes to revisit the “infectious concept” of property and sovereignty. She writes, “I’m annoyed by radical structures that reify the idea of property as THE way to think about our relations to each other and the world.” Rather, she calls for the courage to pay attention to the actual ways we exist with each other, what she calls “the intimacy of interdependency”.

With the help of a selection of texts, from Thi C. Nguyen and Matthew Strohl to Lauren Berlant and Mia Mingus, Andrea provides different entry points to thinking about the shift from property to intimacy. For the ones who have difficulties to engage with long texts, she prepared short introductions summarizing the texts main ideas, as well as her rationale for selecting them. She also sent audio recordings of her prompt with spoken word for ease of access.

→ See Prompt: Real life examples

Intimacy vs. Property[1]

→ Listen to Andrea

I’m annoyed by radical structures that reify the idea of property as THE way to think about our relations to each other and the world. Property is such an infectious concept. In my practice, from looking at motherhood to book piracy to how we evaluate social art practice, it seems that the first thing I encounter is always a taken-for-granted, a postulate: that the path to change and thence liberation is just a matter of redistributing property rights to the RIGHT people and the enabling of “our" sovereignty.
I see this as a trap. One that makes it almost impossible to imagine a different way to think about ourselves and the world. We are terrified of what would happen if we didn’t own the things we care for.

But I think that it is the ‘we care for’ that matters. That there is a different form of relationality that can only exist once we refuse to play the property and sovereignty game and pay attention to the actual ways in which we exist with each other. I call this the intimacy of interdependency.

In this prompt, I propose that the Collective Conditions for Re-Use falls into the same trap. That in its attempts to solve the ‘problem’ of intersectionality and power imbalances in systems like copy-left or creative commons, it reifies the all too well established (mis)conception that property is the only way in which we can think ourselves and the world, expanding the market into every sphere of our lives — particularly those spheres which specifically sought to separate themselves of the market. That it attempts to improve what needs to be dismantled.[2]
This is a prompt to imagine that we already have a much more sophisticated and interesting way to relate to what we all bring into being in the world. We do. We just need to stop making frameworks that try to make it legible and accessible to systems of power.

This prompt gestures towards a series of texts and notes that offer different definitions, doubts/limitations, and ways to use intimacy to think together about what could exist in place of the idea of intellectual property. I’m fully aware that these ways require profound changes in how we organise the world. I don’t have a solution. I just want us to imagine better.

Andrea Francke
London, 4th of April 2024

Group Intimacy

→ Listen to Andrea

Nguyen and Strohl’s text is in itself a prompt. It proposes a framework of group intimacy as one way to dismantle the concept of cultural appropriation, intimacy re-placing the centrality of property in that debate.
Many accounts of intimacy in academia are constructed around privacy and publicness, but Nguyen and Strohl foreground those aspects of intimacy that are most interesting to me, the relational aspects.

“Her [Inness’] account is intended to explain interpersonal intimacy, but we suggest that it points to a promising way of understanding group intimacy.[3] For Inness, what makes an act intimate is that it expresses an agent’s loving, liking or caring for another person and thereby has special meaning and value for the agent. We propose that, in the case of larger groups, what makes a practice intimate is that it functions to embody or promote a sense of common identity and group connection among participants in the practice, and thereby renders it meaningful and valuable to these participants.” (Thi Nguyen and Strohl, 2019, p. 12)

Once we move away from property and into relationality, ideas of care, affection and maintenance gain in importance. If the process of how we use stuff, including ideas and the expression of those ideas by others, is concerned with if and how we are extracting or contributing — who are we inconveniencing? how are we contributing to our communities or despoiling them? how are we inconvenienced? — and if those effects are constantly negotiated and re-considered, then how does a license facilitate or obscure our relation to those inconveniences and to others?

“But, crucially, the intimacy account does not yield objective determinations about who can participate in an intimate practice. Intimacy is flexible — relations of intimacy can be extended, outsiders can be granted temporary or long-term insider status, insiders can be exiled, and boundaries can be re-drawn. Furthermore, notice the order of operations with intimacy. It is not the case that a relationship is first established as intimate, and only then can the participants in the relationship engage in intimate acts. Engaging in intimate acts is what constitutes an intimate relationship. […] Intimate groups can sometimes self-constitute through intimate practices – they can come into existence as a result of self-identification, valuation, and mutual engagement through intimate practices.” (Thi Nguyen and Strohl, 2019, p. 16)

On Intimacy and On the Inconvenience of Other People

→ Listen to Andrea

A contract holds the potential for clarity (Nguyen, 2021), for stability, for a resolution. What is so seductive about sovereignty[4] and property is the illusion that you have a firm ground to stand on.
Intimacy refuses the stability of clarity because relationality (that is interdependence) is almost never stable. Intimacy is always already negotiated between subjects, at a bodily scale. The way you related to someone’s work yesterday might no longer be quite right today, and vice-versa. When you realise someone is using your work in a way that you don’t agree with, or in a way that erases you, or when you realise you’ve used someone’s work in a way that has harmed them or annoyed them, you feel it in your body. That’s what I want to hold onto. To refuse the creation of a ‘neutral’ admin infrastructure that takes the awkwardness[5] out.

“I didn't think it would turn out this way” is the secret epitaph of intimacy. To intimate is to communicate with the sparest of signs and gestures, and at its root intimacy has the quality of eloquence and brevity. But intimacy also involves an aspiration for a narrative about something shared, a story about both oneself and others that will turn out in a particular way.” (Berlant, 1998, p. 282)

My favourite part of Berlant’s text is the acknowledgement of how terrifying intimacy can be, how much can and will go wrong, how much needs to be constantly renegotiated.[6]

“There, and here, the commons concept serves as a preserve for an optimistic attachment to recaptioning the potential for collective nonsovereignty and as a register for the gatekeeping and surveillance that organises still so many collective pleasures. So, if the commons claim sounds like an incontestably positive aim, I think of it more as a tool, and often a weapon, for unlearning the world, which is key to not reproducing it.“ (Berlant, 2022, p. 80)

Access Intimacy and Liberatory Access

→ Listen to Andrea

Mingus’ access intimacy[7] is about the closeness that happens when someone has an immediate (or intuitive) understanding of your access needs, when certain conditions are met in a moment of relationality that means you can be vulnerable, cared for, and caring for someone else, sometimes without previously having known each other. (Mingus, 2011) Mingus uses access intimacy to imagine a different way in which abled and disabled people can imagine a different future, one that cannot be brought into being by policy, bureaucracy or design. It’s a call for a political re-organisation of the world around interdependence and away from ideas of sovereignty.

“Liberatory access gets us closer to the world we want and ache for, rather than simply reinforcing the status quo. It lives in the now and the future. There is no liberatory access without access intimacy, and in fact, access intimacy is one of the main criteria for liberatory access. Liberatory access understands addressing inaccessibility and ableism as an opportunity for building deeper relationships with each other, realigning our selves with our values and what matters most to us, and challenging oppression. Liberatory access calls upon us to create different values for accessibility than we have historically had. It demands that the responsibility for access shifts from being an individual responsibility to a collective responsibility. That access shifts from being silencing to freeing; from being isolating to connecting; from hidden and invisible to visible; from burdensome to valuable; from a resentful obligation to an opportunity; from shameful to powerful; from ridged to creative. It’s the “good” kind of access, the moments when we are pleasantly surprised and feel seen. It is a way of doing access that transforms both our “today” and our “tomorrow.” In this way, liberatory access both resists against the world we don’t want and actively builds the world we do want.”(Mingus, 2017)

I propose we think about intimacy in an abolitionist way. I know that we live in a world that is mediated by laws, contracts and infrastructures built upon and which consolidate the idea of property (and rentiers). But I propose that we should imagine and practice a different way of being that is invested in relations over property.
We are too solely invested in the idea that the way to solve issues of labour and distribution, and even equality, is to multiply access to property rights.

Other possible references to think intimacy vs. property with

→ Listen to Andrea

A few years ago, I started a basic Quechua course.[8] Quechua is one of the indigenous languages spoken in Peru, where I’m from. Although I’ve never learnt it as a child, I’ve realised as I’ve grown older how much of the Quechua language and culture — sometimes called Andean Philosophy — has influenced the way I think and live the world. In one of the sessions, the teacher talked about how there are no native Quechua words for ‘please’ and ‘thank you’, only neologisms needed to adapt the language to a European framework. She explained how you don’t need the words for ‘please’ and ‘thank you’ because those are just words that allowed Europeans not to act.
On the other hand, she explained, if you are part of a Quechua community, you will keep an eye on what is needed, and then just do it.[9] You won’t need a ‘please’, and you won’t expect a ‘thank you’. At some point, if you need help, there will be other people around you paying attention and help will happen.
That relation between attention, care, and being part of a (or many) community(ies) made so much sense to me. This is also part of an understanding of the world in which the non-human is very present. This relation of intimacy that allows one to perceive when one is needed and act, exists also in relation to mountains, animals, places, etc. It made me think about my relation to other people’s work, how I share things – including things that aren’t mine, to how I put things in the world and how accessible I construct them so people can take them apart and use them.
There is another approach that I wanted to include, but I just didn’t have the time. In The Logic of Care, Annemarie Mol looks at the relationships between the ill and their carers. Mol proposes that those relations follow a different logic that refuses the logic of choice (which either follows consumer or citizenship logics) but instead is constructed collaboratively through continued attunement.

Footnotes

  1. Special thanks to Lamis Bayar who always edits my texts in what feels like continuous conversation.
  2. Thank you to Daniel Rourke for introducing me to this quote from Boris Groys: “I hope that the political function of these two divergent and even contradictory notions of aestheticization—artistic aestheticization and design aestheticization—has now became more clear. Design wants to change reality, the status quo—it wants to improve reality, to make it more attractive, better to use. Art seems to accept reality as it is, to accept the status quo. But art accepts the status quo as dysfunctional, as already failed—that is, from the revolutionary, or even postrevolutionary, perspective. Contemporary art puts our contemporaneity into art museums because it does not believe in the stability of the present conditions of our existence—to such a degree that contemporary art does not even try to improve these conditions. By defunctionalizing the status quo, art prefigures its coming revolutionary overturn.“ (Groys, 2014)
  3. As referred to by Nguyen and Strohl: Inness, J.C. (1996) Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
  4. “As I argue in the introduction, my view is that sovereignty is at root a defense against occupation or dispossession, which is why it’s become central to antagonisms about jurisdiction, and not anything like a natural right or natural state. “(Berlant, 2022, p. 80)
  5. For an expanded definition of awkwardness, listen to: Francke, A. and de Kersaint Giraudeau, M. (2016) Bad Vibes Club at CCA - The Rise of the Awkward Turtle. Available at: https://soundcloud.com/ccaderrylondonderry/bad-vibes-club-at-cca-the-rise-of-the-awkward-turtle (Accessed: 8 April 2024).
  6. “It shows how some thinkers use the commons concept to move away from good-life fantasies that equate frictionlessness with justice and satisfaction with the absence of frustration.“ (Berlant, 2022, p. 81)
  7. “And I want to be clear, I didn’t invent access intimacy, I simply gave a name to something that was happening in my life and I hope it’s useful to others. Just because you name something doesn’t mean you invented it.”(Mingus, 2017)
  8. Curso introductorio de Quechua Chanka | sesión 4: presentarse y pedir información (2020). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLe4DNTZx3LngmX5xSJUuowp5jLL_ZZOui (Accessed: 2 April 2024).
  9. This form of attention and responsiveness sounds very similar to Mia Mingus’s Access Intimacy.

Bibliography

Berlant, Lauren. ‘Intimacy: A Special Issue’. Critical Inquiry 24, no. 2 (1998): 281–88. PDF

Berlant, L.G. (2022) On the inconvenience of other people. Durham: Duke University Press (Writing matters!). PDF

Groys, B. (2014) ‘On Art Activism - Journal #56’, e-flux Journal [Preprint], (56). Available at: https://www.e-flux.com/journal/56/60343/on-art-activism/ (Accessed: 19 February 2024).

Thi Nguyen, C., and Matthew Strohl. ‘Cultural Appropriation and the Intimacy of Groups’. Philosophical Studies 176, no. 4 (1 April 2019): 981–1002, PDF

Mingus, M. (2011) ‘Access Intimacy: The Missing Link’, Leaving Evidence, 5 May. Available at: https://leavingevidence.wordpress.com/2011/05/05/access-intimacy-the-missing-link/ (Accessed: 19 February 2024).

Mingus, M. (2017) ‘Access Intimacy, Interdependence and Disability Justice’, Leaving Evidence, 12 April. Available at: https://leavingevidence.wordpress.com/2017/04/12/access-intimacy-interdependence-and-disability-justice/ (Accessed: 19 February 2024).

Mol, A. (2008) The logic of care: health and the problem of patient choice.